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Introduction
The recent global financial crisis (GFC) consisted of the banking and sub-prime crises in 2006-2009 and the European debt crisis (EDC) which started in late-2009. The GFC presented challenges for credit rating agencies (CRAs) and triggered increased scrutiny of their performance. During the EDC, CRAs faced pressures from various directions on the timing and severity of downgrade actions (e.g. see IMF, 2010; Powell, 2013) . The main aims of this paper are to analyse differences in the negative credit actions of the three largest CRAs during the GFC and to assess their impact on European equity markets. We also examine whether recent EU regulation of CRAs 1 reveals any effects on the CRAs' negative signals and their market impact. The investigation focuses on sovereign ratings, given their crucial importance from credit market and financial stability perspectives (European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), 2013a). Sovereign ratings have a strong influence on other ratings, including those of banks (e.g. Williams et al., 2013) and corporates (e.g. Borensztein et al., 2013) . Sovereign credit news can have a strong effect on bond and equity valuations (e.g. Gande and Parsley, 2005; Ferreira and Gama, 2007; Hill and Faff, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012) .
Developed sovereigns have historically been assigned high and stable investmentgrade ratings. Prior to the GFC, it was mainly the emerging economies that experienced low credit ratings, ratings instability and split ratings. 2 However, this situation has changed rapidly in recent years, with ESMA (2013a) noting volatility in European sovereign ratings.
During the EDC (especially 2010-2012), many European countries, particularly Greece, 1 In this paper, the term 'recent EU regulation' refers to the establishment of a new regulatory regime in July 2011, when the European Securities and Markets Authority assumed responsibility for European CRA regulation. 2 Split ratings occur when different CRAs assign unequal ratings to the same issuer at the same time. Prior studies (e.g. Morgan, 2002; attribute split ratings to issuers' opaqueness or to different rating methodologies and differing factors used by CRAs in judging issuers' creditworthiness.
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, suffered from higher borrowing costs 3 and serial negative credit signals from CRAs, driven by increased government deficits and debt levels, and weak economic growth (e.g. Moody's, 2011; Fitch, 2012; S&P, 2012) . The deterioration in European sovereign creditworthiness had an adverse impact on European banks' ratings, funding costs, market access and share prices (e.g. Alsakka et al., 2014; Correa et al. 2014; Gennaioli et al., 2014) . Split ratings have also been persistent for many high-rated sovereigns, such as Austria, France, and the UK during the EDC. Although some European countries have shown positive sovereign rating trends since the second half of 2013, they still face challenges arising from indebtedness and restrictive financing conditions.
The rating industry is concentrated among the three largest CRAs. Moody's (S&P) accounts for 34.8% (34.6%) of the market, while Fitch's share is 17.7% (ESMA, 2013b) .
Issuers seek multiple ratings to address any information gaps across CRAs, hoping to improve their ratings. Investors are averse to uncertainty, which can be reduced by additional ratings (e.g. Bongaerts et al. 2012; Fabozzi and Vink, 2015) . The common practice by financial regulators and academic studies to treat the ratings from major CRAs as equally informative is questionable. Our investigation reveals significant insights on differences among the three CRAs in their assessments of sovereign creditworthiness. It also identifies differences in the manner in which CRAs adjust their ratings, along with differential impact of their actions on European equity markets. Such evidence is highly relevant to the perceptions of markets and regulators about the credibility of these CRAs.
The first research question considers the connection between CRAs' disagreements and subsequent negative sovereign credit signals. This is pertinent during the EDC, when significant divergence in opinion on the creditworthiness of European countries becomes 3 discernible. This is the first study to connect the evolution of European sovereign ratings to the prior split ratings (see Section 2.1). Valuable information is captured in split ratings, which can impact the probabilities of subsequent credit actions (e.g. Livingston et al., 2008) .
Using a daily dataset for 27 European Union (EU) countries for July 2006 to November 2014, we reveal that disagreements in CRA opinions have a significant relation with subsequent negative credit actions by each CRA. This implies that rating differences across the CRAs may improve forecasts of future rating actions. The CRA assigning the superior (inferior) ratings may be anticipated to revise its ratings downwards (upwards). It follows that rating actions which are inconsistent with this can bring surprise content to the financial markets, hence affecting asset prices significantly. Split ratings improve the predictability of downgrade actions on the superior ratings, making those actions less influential upon financial markets.
Hence, we raise a second research question: 'do pre-event split ratings affect the stock markets' reactions to CRAs' negative credit signals?' The originality of this element arises from analysing the equity market impact of negative credit signals from the perspective of split ratings. In this aspect, we focus only on sovereigns with split ratings immediately before a rating action occurs. For a particular event announced by a CRA, the status of its ratings in comparison to other CRAs before the events could either weaken or strengthen the stock price reactions. We anticipate that downgrades on inferior ratings are expected to elicit stronger reactions than downgrades on superior ratings. This second research question is motivated by Vu et al. (2015) who show that the reactions of sovereign bond spreads to negative credit signals are affected by CRAs' opinion differences. Whereas Vu et al. (2015) study global bond markets during 2000-2012, we examine European stock markets during the GFC. Consistent with the findings of Vu et al. (2015) Alter and Beyer (2014) and Harari (2014) ).
Our third research question investigates the impact of the recent EU regulation of CRAs operating in Europe. 4 In response to the role of CRAs at the outset of the GFC, formal EU regulation of CRAs was instigated in December 2009. The aim of this new regime was to maintain confidence in the rating industry, to decrease overreliance on credit ratings and (importantly in our context) to reduce mechanistic market reactions to credit rating signals. In
July 2011, supervision of CRAs in Europe was assigned to ESMA, which has the power to take enforcement action. 5 We investigate whether the impact of split ratings on future negative credit actions (the focus of our first research question), and the effect of split ratings on stock market responses to CRAs' sovereign negative events (the focus of our second research question), vary between pre-and post-EU CRA regulation (with the cut-off in July 2011). There is very sparse prior literature on such issues. 6 Our investigation provides indicative evidence of the effectiveness of the recent EU regulation in reducing (mechanistic) market reactions. Specifically, we find that the market impact of S&P negative actions is only 4 This presents a further contribution beyond Vu et al. (2015) , who did not address the impact of the EU regulation of CRAs. 5 Further details are discussed in Section 2.2. 6 Jorion et al. (2005) and Poon and Evans (2013) 
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significant in the pre-regulation period, in line with our findings that connections among the three CRAs' actions are much more evident in the pre-regulation period.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data sample, Section 4 presents the methodology, Section 5
analyses the results, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Key themes associated with the empirical analysis

Rating migrations, split ratings and market impact
Rating dynamics are crucial for the application of risk management and pricing (Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2007) . Estimates of rating migration probabilities are at the core of several risk management tools and credit risk managers utilize CRAs' rating migration information. Hence, understanding the factors which affect the probabilities of rating transition has wide relevance. Rating volatility (i.e. the frequency and size of rating actions)
is affected by economic cycles (e.g. Bangia et al., 2002; Livingston et al. 2008) , and the period that an issuer remains in a specific rating category (e.g. Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2007) . Prior rating changes, outlooks and watch status have predictive power for the direction of future rating transitions by the same CRA (Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2007 Credit rating signals can trigger re-weighting of assets and impact on market prices. Prior evidence shows that negative sovereign rating signals have a significant impact on equity and bond markets, while positive news has a more limited impact (e.g. Brooks et al., 2004; Gande 6 and Parsley, 2005; Hill and Faff, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012) . 7 Ferreira and Gama (2007) investigate the cross-country spill-over effects of sovereign rating changes in international stock markets, and show that rating downgrades (but not upgrades) trigger cross-border effects. Due to the close link between sovereign risk and the operation of the banking system, sovereign rating signals can induce reactions in banks' share prices (Correa et al., 2014) . In this literature on the market impact of sovereign credit events, the actions of each CRA are typically examined independently of each other, whereby the effects of split ratings between CRAs are ignored. When one CRA revises their ratings, stock price reactions are likely to be affected by whether a split rating is widening or narrowing.
Prior empirical studies on split ratings have focused on the causes of split ratings and the market perception of corporate default risk associated with split-rated issuers (e.g. Bongaerts et al., 2012) . Split ratings have a greater tendency to occur for opaque issuers (e.g. Morgan, 2002) . Livingston et al. (2008) find that split rated corporates are prone to be upgraded (downgraded) by the CRA from whom a lower (higher) rating exists. 8 show that the pricing of corporate credit risk is exercised based on both the CRA's credit opinions and the opinion differences, where the heavier weight is placed on the more conservative CRA. Bongaerts et al. (2012) highlight that corporates seek a third rating from Fitch as a "tie-breaker" for debt issues which are split rated by S&P and Moody's. Vu et al. (2015) find that bond market reactions are far stronger for negative signals on the inferior ratings and for positive signals on the superior ratings. 7 To the extent that stock and bond prices are found to respond to credit rating signals, this implies either evidence against the semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis or the presence of private information available only to CRAs that is released into the public domain through credit signals (e.g. Brooks et al, 2004) . If rating signals did not add information, then CRAs' opinions would not matter, and there would be no policy or regulatory concern regarding their activities, which is not the case. 8 Livingston et al. (2008) investigate the links between split ratings and rating migrations, using a sample of corporate issuers rated by S&P and Moody's over the period 1983 to 2001, while we address a related question for European sovereign issuers using more recent data (of crucial importance given the GFC). We also consider outlook and watch status, and include data from Fitch.
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CRAs form their opinions on sovereign creditworthiness based on a combination of both qualitative and quantitative considerations in accordance with proprietary methodologies (ESMA, 2013a) . Some factors used by CRAs are similar, i.e. CRAs in common consider GDP per capita, governmental financial resources, political stability and debt structure (e.g. Mellios and Paget-Blanc, 2006 ), but they use some different qualitative and quantitative factors and attach different weights to these factors (e.g. IMF, 2010; Fabozzi and Vink, 2015) . S&P emphasises the probability of default, while Moody's uses an 'expected losses' approach, which accounts for default probability and loss given default assessments. Fitch considers probability of default and recovery given default. These factors can result in disagreements about the rating level and outlook/watch status of an issuer, leading to split ratings. These factors could also affect the manner in which CRAs adjust their ratings or review their outlook or watch status, and how equity markets react to credit signals from different CRAs.
Recent EU regulatory reforms affecting the rating industry
CRAs have faced increased scrutiny during the GFC. Efforts have been made to enhance the performance, transparency and supervision of CRAs, and to reduce the reliance on ratings (IMF, 2010 
Data sample
The sample consists of daily long-term foreign-currency sovereign ratings, watch status and outlook status which have been assigned by the largest three CRAs (Fitch,
Moody's and S&P) from July 2006 to November 2014 for 27 countries in the European Union (EU). 9 The rating announcements are collated directly from CRAs' publications. We '+1' for positive outlook, '-1' for negative outlook, '-2' for negative watch, and '0' for stable 9 The start date is chosen as broadly consistent with Arezki et al. (2011) . See the Appendix for the list of countries. Croatia joined the EU in July 2013, which is too late for this sample period. 10 AAA/Aaa rated issuers have the highest quality and the lowest default risk, while issuers rated at SD-D/C categories are in default. See Tichy (2011) for a fuller explanation of the alphabetical ratings. 11 A complete CRA credit opinion on an issuer consists of a credit rating and a rating outlook/watch status. Several studies (e.g. Hill and Faff, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012) find that outlook and watch signals are at least as important as rating changes in their market impact. Using the CCR scale, the same numerical score may represent different credit status. For example, issuers rated AAA with negative watch and AA+ with positive outlook carry the same numerical score '56'. However, migrations between states with the same numerical score are extremely unlikely and there are no such cases in the data sample. Also, in the lowest numerical category, the only case of outlook/watch was when Greece was rated CC/Negative outlook by S&P between 27 July 2011 and 27 February 2012, and we include this in numerical category '1' using the 58-point rating scale.
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outlook and no watch/outlook assignments (Sy 2004 There are 75,743 daily observations for each CRA. Figure 1 presents the distribution of daily numerical ratings. AAA/Aaa ratings represent 34% of the total number of daily observations. This is driven by some AAA/Aaa-rated sovereigns having no rating actions throughout the sample period (e.g. Denmark and Sweden). Speculative-grade ratings represent only 8.6% of the total. The average rating of the 27 EU countries by each CRA is '16' ('A+/A1') using the 20-notch scale. Using the 58-point scale, S&P assigns a slightly lower average rating ('45') than Moody's and Fitch ('46').
Rows 1-17 of Table 1 ).
13 Table 2 shows that rating disagreements are common across the CRAs, with 52.2%
(39.9%) of daily observations in the case of S&P and Moody's (Fitch) Fitch) . This was driven by economic growth, the accession of some countries to the EU, and a benign macroeconomic environment. 14 Almost all countries in the sample have experienced split ratings during the period July 2006-November 2014 using the 58-point rating scale, with the exceptions of Denmark and Sweden across the three CRAs, and Finland in the case of Moody's versus Fitch. appears to be harsher than Fitch, with S&P assigning a lower rating than Fitch in around 80%
of cases during the pre-regulation period and 66% of the cases in the post-regulation period.
The high percentages of disagreement between CRAs on their assessment of the creditworthiness of European countries are not surprising. In the GFC context, it is more difficult to determine the amounts and recoverability of vast potential losses to investors from holding sovereign debt. Investors holding Greek, Irish and Portuguese debt are potentially exposed to bailout agreements, which are dependent on successful implementation of austerity programmes. Moreover, the strong interdependence among EU countries complicates the assessment of cross-border debt holdings and potential spill-over effects.
There are differences of opinion about EU countries' prospects for effective spending cuts, increased tax revenues/compliance, economic growth, support for banking systems, and the countries' financial and economic stability.
Methodology
For the analysis of split ratings, both directions (rating, outlook or watch status from a given CRA is higher or lower than that from the other CRA) and size of split rating are considered. Models for future downgrades and upgrades should be estimated separately due to their expected different behaviour (e.g. Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2007; Livingston et al., 2008) . Because of limited upgrades within the sample (see Table 1 ) 15 , we only estimate downgrade models, as follows: 
) and the β, λ, γ, ψ and ζ coefficients.
1N-H-Aim (2N-H-Aim
) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if sovereign i has one notch (> one-notch) higher rating from CRA A than from CRA B at 90 days 16 (m) prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise.
is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if sovereign i has one notch (> one-notch) lower rating from CRA A than from CRA B at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise.
is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if sovereign i has a watch status with a more (less) favourable/positive implication by CRA A than that by CRA B at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise. 16 The choice of the 90-day look-back time horizon
Watch-Aim, L-Watch-Aim variables in Eq. 1 and Eq. 2) is consistent with Williams et al. (2013) and Alsakka et al. (2014) . Further, the CRAs express an ex-ante target of 90 days to take action once an issuer is placed on a watch list (e.g. Williams et al., 2013) . Specit is a control dummy taking the value of 1 if sovereign i is rated at the speculative-grade category within the prior 90 days (by either CRA A or B) before the rating change by the potential follower, and 0 otherwise. This variable is included to account for the influence of the current level of rating on subsequent credit actions.
Growthit indicates the annual GDP growth rate (obtained from the World Bank) in country i in the year of the rating change by the follower CRA. It controls for any effect of the business cycle in country i on the probabilities of subsequent credit actions, and its inclusion is motivated by Bangia et al. (2002) and Livingston et al. (2008) .
Co is a series of country dummy variables to control for any country-specific effects.
Y is a series of year dummies, which are included to account for the time effect, i.e. potential variation in rating change patterns over the sampled years.
We calculate the marginal effects (MEs) to estimate the economic impact of the significant factors on the probabilities of rating changes. MEs estimate the change in the dependent variable that is caused by a 1-unit change in an independent variable when the other independent variables are kept at their mean.
Following the investigation of rating transitions of split-rated European countries, we examine the information content of sovereign credit signals in the domestic stock markets. As above, we only investigate negative signals. The data on equity market indices are obtained from Bloomberg L.P. and the headline indices in each national stock market are used. 17 We estimate the models as follows:
CARit is the cumulative mean-adjusted abnormal return for days t and t+1 of country i subject to the credit event announced on day t (see Hill and Faff, 2010) . The mean return, which represents the expected daily return, is calculated using 120 trading days, from day t-130 to day t-11. The daily abnormal log return is derived by subtracting the expected log return from the realized log return on market indices. Abnormal log returns are accumulated over the two consecutive days to give cumulative abnormal returns. Using returns in a very short window [t, t +1] avoids the contamination problem documented by Gande and Parsley (2005) .
Abnormal returns are denominated in USD in order to ensure that returns for different markets are comparable (e.g. Correa et al., 2014 CCRit is the average of pre-event ratings assigned by the two CRAs to country i on date t-1. It is considered as a control variable which summarizes the economic fundamentals, political and financial conditions of the sovereign i when the credit event occurs.
PRIOREVENTSit is the cumulative CCR changes of country i during the 14 days prior to day t. This captures the intensity of event clustering emphasized by Gande and Parsley (2005) .
VIXt controls for the effect of market volatility on the sensitivity of stock prices to adverse information. VIXt is the log change of the CBOE Volatility index during the event window (obtained from Datastream). We anticipate abnormal returns to be negative in response to negative signals and the reactions to be more pronounced when market volatility is high.
Co and Y are defined as in Eq.
(1) and Eq. (2).
We use negative credit signals for split rated sovereigns only, i.e. 446 events which relate to 25 European countries (i.e. excluding Denmark and Sweden). On matching rating data with equity market data, the number of negative events is reduced from 446 to 416
(consisting of 211 events in the pre-regulation period and 205 events in the post-regulation period). Following Ferreira and Gama (2007) , for each country in the sample, events are matched with an equal number of non-events collected randomly from all the non-event days available in the period. In order to ensure that returns on non-event days do not reflect a reaction to a rating signal, non-event days must be outside a 61-day event window (t-30, t+30). Hence, the intercept in Eq. (3) reflects the average abnormal returns for a non-event day and the slope coefficient  measures the incremental returns on event days when CRAs announce a unit change in CCR.
For every event by a particular CRA, the pre-event rating affected by the announcement is either inferior (lower) or superior (higher) to the second rating assigned by another CRA which remains unchanged on the event date. it SUP takes the value of one if the CRA's rating subject to the announcement is superior (higher) compared with the other CRA, and zero otherwise.
it INF takes the value of one if the CRA's rating subject to the announcement is inferior (lower) compared with the other CRA. The model is specified as follows:
 and 2  measure the specific effects of a negative outlook signal (a change by one CCR point) for the superior ratings and inferior ratings, respectively. Vu et al. (2015) apply a similar specification to study global bond markets. To estimate the effect of a onenotch downgrade (three CCR points), 1  and 2  are multiplied by three. We anticipate that downgrading the inferior ratings leads to a more significant decrease in stock prices, hence we expect 2  to be significant and larger than 1  .
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We also examine the impact of split ratings on the cross-border effects of negative credit actions in Europe by each CRA. For each sovereign event in the home country i (i.e. ∆CCRit),
we pool all the non-event countries j and compute the abnormal returns of their stock market indices in the window [t, t+1] (i.e. CARjt). We match each set of non-event country returns for a given event in the home country i with randomly selected clean non-event-day observations for these non-event countries. We estimate the following equations:
Similar to Eq. (3) and (4), we include full sets of year and country dummies (event country and non-event country), prior events, log change of the CBOE Volatility index and the levels of event and non-event country comprehensive credit rating. 
Empirical results
Relationship between split ratings and rating dynamics
The impact of split ratings on stock markets' reactions to negative credit signals
Estimation results for Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) are reported in In summary, Table 7 adds important evidence to support our expectation about the market reactions to negative signals for split-rated European countries. Split ratings increase the likelihood that the higher ratings will be downgraded. S&P's decisions to downgrade ratings which are already inferior to those assigned by other CRAs impart strong signals about weakening creditworthiness. This is in line with Vu et al. (2015) for global bond markets. Table 8 for the post-regulation period are consistent with this. In summary, the sub-period analysis reveals evidence of a possible effect of the European CRA regulation on the stock market reactions to S&P's signals.
Spill-over effects
Prior studies have reported that the market impact of rating signals extends beyond geographical borders (e.g. Arezki et al., 2011) . We investigate the impact of split ratings on the cross-border effects of negative credit actions by the three CRAs, using Eq. (5) and Eq.
(6), with the results presented in Table 9 . We find significant stock market reactions in nonevent countries j in the anticipated direction when S&P announces a negative credit action on the event country i. The strong evidence in the case of S&P is consistent with Section 5.2 on the 'own-market' effects. The pre-event split ratings influence the intensity of the spill-over effects in non-event countries. When S&P rates lower than either Moody's or Fitch and downgrades a country, we find significant negative abnormal returns of 0.31% (when S&P rates lower than Moody's) and 0.25% (when S&P rates lower than Fitch), which are up to five times larger than the abnormal returns estimated for the negative outlook actions that occur when S&P rates higher than either Moody's or Fitch.
22
We also examine the spill-over effects during the pre-and post-regulation periods.
A similar picture emerges when we consider spill-over effects in the pre-regulation period compared with the results in Table 9 . Interestingly, we observe much weaker and inconsistent 22 Unexpectedly, a negative credit action by Moody's (Fitch) for a given event country induces a positive reaction in stock markets of its neighbour (non-event) countries in the region. However, the magnitude of the coefficients on the rating change variable ∆CCRit is small (below 0.1%). Importantly, when split ratings are taken into account, Moody's (Fitch) negative actions induce negative responses in non-event countries, and this applies when Moody's (Fitch) assigns lower ratings than S&P (Moody's).
spill-over effects in the post-regulation period. For example, when S&P announces a negative outlook signal, the non-event countries' abnormal returns are estimated at -0.31% in the preregulation period, while the coefficient is insignificant in the post-regulation period. Also, S&P negative outlook signals on sovereigns rated lower by S&P than Fitch induce negative abnormal returns of 0.11% in the post-regulation period compared to 0.27% pre-regulation. This is consistent with Section 5.2.
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In summary, these findings show that negative signals by S&P not only affect the own-country stock markets but also spill-over to other European countries' stock returns. Yet, the effect is weaker following the recent EU regulation of CRAs. Consistent with Section 5.2, there are stronger spill-over reactions when S&P assigns a lower rating than the other CRAs prior to its downgrade action.
Conclusions
This paper examines credit actions by the largest three CRAs (Moody's, S&P and Fitch) during the GFC. We investigate: (i) the impact of differences in ratings and outlook/watch status across CRAs on subsequent credit signals, (ii) the effect of split ratings on the stock market response to CRAs' sovereign credit events (both own-country and spillover effects), and (iii) the influence of the recently established European regulatory regime for CRAs in the context of (i) and (ii). DN , which equal 1, 2, 3, 4, representing downgrades by 1, 2, 3, >3 CCR points using the 58-point scale by Moody's, S&P, Fitch respectively, or 0 otherwise. The independent variables are as follows. 1N-H-CRA (2N-H-CRA) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a given sovereign has a one notch (>one-notch) higher rating from the given CRA at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise. 1N-L-CRA (2N-L-CRA) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a given sovereign has one-notch (> one-notch) lower rating from the given CRA at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise. H-Watch-CRA (L-Watch-CRA) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a given sovereign has watch status with a more (less) favourable/positive implication by the given CRA at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise. H-Outlook-CRA (L-Outlook-CRA) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if given sovereign has outlook status with a more (less) favourable/positive implication by the given CRA at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise. Spec is a dummy taking the value of 1 if a given sovereign is rated at the speculative-grade category within the prior 90 days (by at least one CRA) before the credit action by the potential follower CRA, 0 otherwise. Growth is the growth rate in a given country in the year of credit action. Full sets of year and country dummies are included. We apply Huber-White robust standard errors. We also estimate and report the impact of each variable on the probability of a rating change (marginal effect (ME)), but only for variables with significant (at 10% or lower) coefficients. ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. The estimates of the four threshold parameters are significant at the 1% level in all estimations, and are not shown here. and III (II and IV), which equal 1, 2, 3, 4, representing downgrades by 1, 2, 3, >3 CCR points using the 58-point scale by Moody's (S&P), or 0 otherwise. For the definitions of the independent variables, see Table 3 . If there are a very limited number of observations which are >1-notch higher (lower) from the given CRA (i.e. 2N-H-CRA (2N-L-CRA)), we combine these observations into the variable '1N-H-CRA' ('1N-L-CRA'). In other words, '1&2N-H-CRA'('1&2N-L-CRA') is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a given sovereign has 1 or >1 notch higher (lower) rating from the given CRA at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise. We apply Huber-White robust standard errors. We also estimate the impact of each variable on the probability of a rating change (marginal effect (ME)), but we only report the average ME (Ave ME) for variables with significant (at 10% or lower) coefficients. 'Ave ME' is the mean of the ME values for the four downgrade categories. The ME for each downgrade category (as presented in Table 3 ) is not reported in the interests of brevity, but is available on request. ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. The estimates of the four threshold parameters are significant at the 1% level in all estimations, and are not shown here. and III (II and IV), which equal 1, 2, 3, 4, representing downgrades by 1, 2, 3, >3 CCR points using the 58-point scale by Fitch (S&P), or 0 otherwise. For the definitions of the independent variables, see Table 3 . If there are a very limited number of observations which are >1-notch higher (lower) from the given CRA (i.e. 2N-H-CRA (2N-L-CRA)), we combine these observations into the variable '1N-H-CRA' ('1N-L-CRA'). In other words, '1&2N-H-CRA'('1&2N-L-CRA') is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a given sovereign has 1 or >1 notch higher (lower) rating from the given CRA at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise.We apply Huber-White robust standard errors. We also estimate the impact of each variable on the probability of a rating change (marginal effect (ME)), but we only report the average ME (Ave ME) for variables with significant (at 10% or lower) coefficients. The ME for each downgrade category is not reported in the interests of brevity, but is available on request. ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. The estimates of the four threshold parameters are significant at the 1% level in all estimations, and are not shown here. and III (II and IV), which equal 1, 2, 3, 4, representing downgrades by 1, 2, 3, >3 CCR points using the 58-point scale by Fitch (Moody's), or 0 otherwise. For the definitions of the independent variables, see Table 3 . If there are a very limited number of observations which are >1-notch higher (lower) from the given CRA (i.e. 2N-H-CRA (2N-L-CRA)), we combine these observations into the variable '1N-H-CRA' ('1N-L-CRA'). In other words, '1&2N-H-CRA'('1&2N-L-CRA') is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a given sovereign has 1 or >1 notch higher (lower) rating from the given CRA at 90 days prior to the credit action at time t, 0 otherwise.We apply Huber-White robust standard errors. We also estimate the impact of each variable on the probability of a rating change (marginal effect (ME)), but we only report the average ME (Avr ME) for variables with significant (at 10% or lower) coefficients. The ME for each downgrade category is not reported in the interests of brevity, but is available on request. ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. The estimates of the four threshold parameters are significant at the 1% level in all estimations, and are not shown here. index of the event country on day t. "SUP" and "INF" are the dummies of superior and inferior ratings assigned by the CRA announcing the credit signal compared with one of the other two CRAs on day t-1. CCR is the average rating on the 58-point rating scale assigned to the sovereigns affected by the credit actions on day t-1. Prior Events measures the cumulative rating changes by all the three CRAs during the 14 days prior to the event days. VIX is the log change in the CBOE Volatility Index calculated for the window [t, t +1]. Full sets of year and country dummies are included. The model is estimated with Huber-White robust standard errors. t-values are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * refer to significant coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. parenthesis. ***, **, and * refer to significant coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
